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The Presidential Employment Stimulus has created more than one million jobs and livelihood opportunities since its inception two years ago. In the arts and culture sector, particularly badly affected by the pandemic, the intervention has been an important catalyst for creative new work.

Trade protection in South Africa has increased overall since 2014. This has manifested in a rising incidence of tariffs covering intermediate (e.g., steel) and consumer goods, including poultry, pasta, and frozen chips, of which poultry is by far the most important for South African consumers. The South African Poultry Association has contested the view that anti-dumping duties on chicken raise domestic prices. However, an econometric study shows that although there is a complex relationship between trade policies and consumer prices, the net effect on these products, including frozen chicken, has been to raise them.

The criminal justice system faces severe challenges: as organised crime has risen, the capacity of the system has diminished. A close look at Budget expenditure shows that, in the past decade, the number of police officials has declined, as has police spending per citizen. This, while employee compensation has risen in the same period. Similar trends are evident in the courts. In correctional services, although the number of officials has remained stable, capital budgets are severely constrained. This shrinking resource base may well exacerbate the threat that crime and disorder pose to the economy and society.

South Africa has the dubious distinction of having one of the highest rates of unemployment and inequality in the world. It is also one of the world’s most emissions-intensive economies, measured in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions per unit of economic output. Historically, both during and after apartheid, state subsidies have favoured capital- and energy-intensive industries. What policies are necessary to change the development path to be both more climate- and labour-friendly?

Regional integration in Africa is underway but progress requires that the gains are widely spread. South Africa’s huge regional trade surplus in manufactured goods is leading to protectionist pressures in neighbouring countries. Agro-processing is a large sector that has significant potential, but the export performance of the region has been poor if South Africa is excluded. Regional value chains are failing to include the small economies of southern Africa. Constraints include tariff and non-tariff barriers, weak infrastructure, as well as poorly developed local suppliers. Some retail chains, supported by governments and NGOs, are now taking the lead in developing small-scale suppliers in the region. But other policies to improve the regulatory and investment environment are also necessary.

About 60% of South African households use minibus taxis as their main mode of transport. They spend about 26% of their gross earnings in doing so. Should taxi operators receive subsidies from the state? There are several reasons why policymakers should think about enhancing competition and improving efficiency in the public transport sector instead.

South Africa has one of the most progressive income-tax systems in the world. Income tax significantly reduces market-income inequality by flattening the incomes of the rich and providing financing for instruments of social protection, such as the social grants system and free basic services. Personal Income Tax is the government’s largest tax instrument and has increased as a share of tax revenue over the past decade. However, it has become less progressive over time, when measured as a share of income despite rate increases. While the amount of income tax has increased, market incomes, particularly of the top decile, have grown at a greater rate.

Food security has dominated global media headlines since the Russia-Ukraine war began four months ago. While prices of food products are rising globally, not all countries are negatively affected the same way. The poor nations and those with generally low productivity in agriculture, such as much of the African continent, feel the impact more severely than others. South Africa is in a relatively fortunate position because of its vibrant agricultural sector, which cushions the country against food shortages in the foreseeable future, but price increases will be felt by consumers.

The global climate effects of rising carbon emissions are fast becoming too costly to ignore. However, mitigating these effects also carry risks and involve transition costs that can be difficult to estimate upfront. We explore how these developments could affect financial stability and how trends in sustainable finance are being used to respond to the associated threats and opportunities.

Lessons from nine wars since the early 1970s, and the Brexit vote, show that global foreign direct investment inflows generally decline during the year of the war and the year after. South Africa, having embarked on an investment drive since 2018, faces a tough job making the country more investor friendly and marketing it to the rest of the world given the Covid-19 pandemic and most recently the Russia-Ukraine war. Thus, policy makers need to be more aggressive in implementing structural economic reforms alongside public efforts to demonstrate progress, to achieve foreign direct investment targets.

The Russia-Ukraine war has raised concerns about potential escalating global food insecurity as these countries are major exporters of grains, oilseeds, fertilizers, and crude oil. Since the war started, the prices of these commodities have risen significantly, and South Africa, interlinked in the global commodities market, is exposed to these prices increases. This article attempts to show how the conflict may affect South Africa’s agricultural sector, as well as consumers, by focusing on trade linkages of agricultural commodities and inputs prices, as well as price transmissions [1]

As government gears up to announce its programme for the next year, through the State of the Nation address and the Budget, it seems certain that some form of basic income support will be a central part of its agenda. The lockdown-induced shocks have added to the crisis of structural mass unemployment, and of poverty. There also seems to be broad consensus that basic income support is an essential part of our social compact. But the fiscal risks it poses to a fragile economy have not diminished, and government faces some hard trade-offs to ensure these risks are minimized and that other social spending is not compromised.

The political settlement forged around South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy created the conditions for a corporate restructuring of the economy characterized by high profitability, despite low investments. This has involved power entrenchment in large incumbent businesses groups and coalitions of rentieristic interests, which have undermined effective industrial policy implementation and the development of inclusive growth-oriented coalitions. Persistent high unemployment and inequality have fuelled dissatisfaction and contestation over the core objectives of a more developmental state. Industrial policies have also been undermined by the fragmentation of the state.

South Africa’s national budget is one of the most redistributive in the emerging markets, but our rising debt to GDP ratio threatens future economic growth and thus the country’s capacity to both create new jobs and to maintain the social wage. National Treasury will have to continue to provide support in the short term to the vulnerable, whose position has been greatly exacerbated by the pandemic. But without implementing the necessary reforms to put the country on a path of sustainable growth, this will not only simply be papering over the cracks but may significantly increase the debt burden.

Treasury did the best it could in this month’s Medium Term Budget Policy Statement. Half the revenue windfall was used for fiscal consolidation and the other half on spending increases. But real cuts to expenditure are still pending, and cabinet backing is yet to be negotiated. Achieving consolidation next year will be even harder as the commodity boom wanes and election politics wax.

The European Union (EU) is the second most important market for South Africa's agricultural products, accounting for 27% of the country's total agricultural exports. Despite South Africa transitioning from the Trade Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) to the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) to secure continued and improved market access in the EU, a new set of regulations under the EU Green Deal and its Farm to Fork Strategy are set to impose additional compliance costs that will likely negate the benefits of existing preferential trade arrangements. We present a set of challenges, opportunities, and risks that both government and the private sector need to address if South Africa aims to increase agricultural exports to the EU.

South Africa's agricultural exports have grown significantly over the past two decades. Yet agricultural private-sector role players typically argue that the government has not done enough to open up new markets for ever-increasing produce. This failure has limited the country's scope to grow exports beyond existing traditional markets in the European Union (EU) and the African continent. In markets outside these regions, private-sector players argue that the growth in South Africa's agricultural exports has primarily been driven by productivity gains whose competitive advantage overcomes the costs of high tariff and non-tariff barriers. However, a review of South Africa's trade agreements paints a different view, suggesting that private-sector role players might be downplaying the achievements of the past two decades.

A key objective of social security policy is to increase participation in contributory savings arrangements that provide funded incomes in retirement. This is the second of a three-part series on pension fund coverage. The first estimated the size of the pension coverage gap. In this article, the fiscal costs of co-funding universal coverage are examined. In the third part of the series, a tax reform that might pay for a pension plan subsidy is suggested.

The Covid-19 pandemic not only had devastating impacts on health when it hit South Africa in early 2020. It also caused severe economic hardship. What was its impact on poverty and inequality, and what were the effects of the COVID-19 social relief policies? This article, based on a UNU-WIDER/SA-TIED research paper that uses a static tax–benefit microsimulation model known as SAMOD, measures the incomes of people just before and after the first few months of lockdown and evaluates the relief policies put in place. The COVID-19 measures had a substantial effect in reducing poverty and inequality. Our results may lay the foundation for the role that longer-term social grant policies could play in effectively reducing poverty in South Africa.

Higher education is both a private and public good – for society, an investment in the future, for the individual, a chance to improve their lives. But the current model of student funding is neither financially nor fiscally sustainable. It is unlikely that government can fund the “missing middle” – students from households with incomes between R350 000 and R600 000 a year. What then to do? A loan scheme involving universities, government, and the private sector may enable students to graduate and to start re-paying only once their income reaches a certain level.

This is the third in a series of articles by Michael Sachs, extracted from his paper, Fiscal Dimensions of South Africa’s Crisis. In the last article, he showed how the real value of public services has declined over the past decade, and how substantial off-budget allocations to state-owned enterprises have come at a cost to the poor. In this article, he examines the extent of South Africa’s fiscal crisis as the country struggles to recover from the impact of Covid-19. He argues that the recent budget proposes a path of consolidation that will erode core public services further. It will also be difficult to accelerate the pace of economic growth in the face of a large and sustained negative fiscal impulse. But even if the consolidation achieves its targets, it is unlikely to alleviate the debt burden. Rising interest payments mean that rent is drained from the proceeds of production, with implications for economic growth and the distribution of national income. Without an acceleration in nominal GDP, it is difficult to see how South Africa will avoid a period of fiscal and financial disorder.

At the start of the democratic project, South Africa hoped for a “fiscal renaissance”. After a brief period of consolidation, social spending rose, as did remuneration for public servants and expenditure on infrastructure. By the early 2000s, revenue was buoyant, the debt-to-GDP ratio was at historic lows, and the budget balance moved into surplus. But by the second decade of the millennium, growth faltered. And at the very moment that conditions demanded fiscal adjustment, government policy became increasingly incoherent.

Financial inclusion has become an important measure of inclusive economic growth in South Africa, as well as in other parts of the world. But if inclusion cannot be measured accurately it leaves policymakers and market participants making inadequately informed decisions. This article discusses a new quantitative method to construct financial inclusion indices for the nine provinces. The index trends are used to evaluate the state of financial inclusion in the recent past and to make recommendations for further financial sector development policy. The country has made improvements in financial inclusion since 1994. Since then, there has been increased access and usage of financial services. However, between 2015 and 2018 there was an overall reduction in financial services. The decline has been heavily influenced by economic shocks such as decreasing income in various provinces, a decrease in credit extension to the private sector, rising unemployment rate, and rising risks to financial infrastructure. In fact, financial inclusion in 2018 fell back to the level it was in 2014 after a decline that began in 2016. Financial inclusion has increased in Gauteng, Western Cape, and the Eastern Cape; however the Free-State and Northern Cape have experienced declines to below their 2015 level, while the other provinces experienced minor declines.

Women are at far greater risk of losing their income and are more likely to be exposed to the COVID-19 health risk than men because of the type of work they do.

The Covid-19 pandemic presents an opportunity for African governments to relook agriculture as part of the economic recovery plan. A new approach should embrace technology (information technology, mechanical and biotechnology) and private-sector partnerships, as well as the improvement in land governance through the extension of title deeds or long-term, tradeable leases. South Africa presents some examples, particularly on technological advancement, which African countries can emulate.

While the impact of the Covid-19 lock-down on the tourism sector may seem clear, the potential impact on its supply chain has not been investigated. StatsSA data is analysed to establish which goods and services receive the most expenditure from three key tourism industries, but also which goods and services rely most heavily on tourism expenditure. Surprisingly it is soft drinks, tobacco, and transport-related goods that are likely most affected, not construction or agriculture.

The projected increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is set to occur notwithstanding plans to cut the projected increase in government’s salary bill. If government does not overcome labour union resistance to cuts, the debt burden will increase even more. The mounting public debt and government’s apparent inability to reign it in, raises the question whether South Africa finds itself in a debt trap, and if not, what can be done to escape such a trap.

South Africa has a major but overlooked opportunity to expand the production of high-value agricultural products that are both labour-intensive and export-oriented. There is an extensive and growing global demand for these products. Various supply side constraints must be addressed, such as how land is used; public investment in irrigation, agricultural inputs and R&D; development finance; and logistical costs and quality. Around 300 000 jobs could be created directly and indirectly, primarily benefitting the poorest: rural women in former homelands

We analyse the emphasis in informal-sector and informal-economy policy, highlighting who runs the risk of being missed. We then interrogate assumptions on which policy objectives are based – notably that the informal sector acts as a ‘shock absorber’ in times of recession and, given the emphasis on the township economy, the spatial dimensions of informal-sector employment. We argue that policy makers should pay attention to harmful regulations, the infrastructure needed and where informal activities fit in value chains.

We use tax data (which include accurate data for the very rich) to investigate the patterns of income growth over the period 2003 to 2016. Despite the need for inclusive economic growth in the light of extreme inequality, the top 5% of incomes grew at about 5% per year compared to national income growth of 3.7% per year. This divergence is striking in the post-recession period and appears to be partially driven by high growth in income from capital.

This extract from a new REDI3x3 book outlines an appropriate and ‘smart’ policy approach to enable enterprises in the informal sector. Such policies need to be differentiated and nuanced, recognising that both one-person or multi-person enterprises are situated on a developmental spectrum from embryonic to mature states, some ‘survivalist’ and others ‘growth-oriented’, with different aspirations, entrepreneurial aptitudes, degrees of development, complexity and capacity – and different needs and challenges. Factors for good policy design are identified.

In this extract from a new REDI3x3 book, the employment-creating behaviour of informal enterprises is analysed – in particular, enterprises with employees. Almost half of those working in the informal sector work in such multi-person firms – which provide paid work to about 850 000 people (owner-operators plus paid employees). There is a growing employment orientation and employment intensity. Jobs are created via new-firm entry as well as employment expansion – also by one-person enterprises. Entrant firms are vulnerable, though.

Unemployment research typically inquires how to generate more jobs and how to keep workers working. Researchers often probe the reservation wage level (which appears to balance the interests of employees and employers). Qualitative research findings suggest that wages may be less significant factors in work-related decisions than the nature of interpersonal relationships in the workplace. Both employees and employers emphasise the importance of the quality of relationships, though employers and employees highlight different factors.

This article argues that there is a time-series break in StatsSA’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) in the first quarter of 2015. The principal cause appears to be differences between the sampling frames before and after 2015, respectively based on Census 2001 and Census 2011. The break is signalled by a significant increase in the number of one-person households surveyed in the QLFS. It is critical for economists, policy analysts and policy-makers to be aware of this break in the data.

The economy remains highly concentrated and existing firms have substantial advantages over entrants and smaller rivals. These firms can use their power to block rivals, also by influencing regulations in their favour. Changing the structure and the ownership of the economy simultaneously requires a package of measures to tackle the abuse of market power by large firms, change regulations to open up markets, and effectively support the development of the capabilities of smaller firms.

Small-scale agriculture evokes strong views in terms of both its current and potential roles in rural development. We examine how many (or few) Black households in rural areas that are identified as ‘food poor’ in terms of their income levels are able to meet their basic food needs – and the role of household agricultural production. We find that although rural households engaged in some form of farming are more likely to be very poor in terms of their incomes, they actually experience hunger less frequently than non-farming households.

Calculating the earnings Gini coefficient with survey data from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) may lead to an underestimation of inequality. When one compares earnings in the tax assessments data to those in the QLFS, it appears that the earnings of employees in the QLFS are underreported. Benefits and annual bonuses contribute substantially to the gap. In the case of self-employment incomes, the top earnings in the QLFS are also underreported, but the tax data seems to miss many mid- and low-income earners.

Renewed emphasis in policy discourses on systematic land titling to solve insecure tenure in South Africa is understandable. A staggering two thirds of the citizenry hold off-register land rights. Converting these rights to title deeds may seem self-evident, but our research reveals major stumbling blocks. For a system of land records to succeed, its design must take into account well understood and familiar local and customary processes for holding, using and transmitting land in urban and rural areas.

The Wild Coast, in the former Transkei Bantustan, is characterised by natural beauty and great poverty. Since 1994 rural land administration has collapsed, land tenure has not been reformed, a succession of coastal development plans have been proposed but not implemented – and communities have become disillusioned. The few tourist-related developments that have taken root have done so despite the general collapse of rural governance and are due largely to the determination of local developers and their community partners

In the aggregate, earnings from jobs in the informal sector play a small role in reducing national poverty rates, especially because there are relatively few informal-sector jobs. However, if we compare on a per-job basis, the poverty reduction associated with one informal-sector job is generally between 50 to 100% of the poverty reduction associated with one formal-sector job. Growth in the number of jobs in the informal sector would be a sensible component of any plan to reduce poverty.

Growing agriculture can reduce poverty, create economic opportunities in rural and peri-urban areas, and boost employment, particularly for semi- and unskilled workers. We review several successful joint ventures across South Africa which comprise a range of partnerships between smallholders, commercial farmers, agribusinesses, industry associations and government. Many of these partnerships have generated significant returns and transformational benefits. Well-designed joint ventures can complement existing government initiatives to drive more rapid agrarian transformation and increase production.

Informal enterprises are perceived to lack the necessary business and economic fundamentals to stimulate their local economies. However, informal enterprises are not homogenous. In a study of non-retail informal enterprises, we distinguish between Traditional Informal Enterprises (TIEs) and Modernising Informal Enterprises (MIEs) and assess whether Ivory Park and Kaalfontein townships have MIEs to catalyse the local economies. We find that 40% of the non-retail enterprises have a modernising orientation, but that the majority are predominantly traditional.

The reasons for the closure of fairly well-established informal enterprises are varied. Between 2010 and 2015, in the Cape Flats township of Delft South, a key factor was the failure to respond adequately to the more entrepreneurial business model of foreign traders and the strict enforcement of unfavourable liquor trading policies. Still, household misfortunes and broader socio-cultural dynamics also played crucial roles. A richer understanding of why enterprises shut down should inform policy to foster the sustainability of informal enterprises.

The transition from higher education to employment is a challenge, considering persistent graduate un- and underemployment. Qualifications are not enough. Graduates (should) develop a ‘workplace identity’ that improves their chances of being employed. An empirical study shows that achieving employability frequently involves several labour-market states in which personal attributes are utilised but also developed. Most graduates are not prepared for this arduous journey, something both higher education institutions and graduates should attend to.

Higher-than-inflation increases in student fees since 2009 often are blamed on declining government subsidies to universities. This is not entirely correct, if one considers real per-student subsidies. Fee increases resulted mainly from cost pressures faced by universities due to growing student numbers and a weakening rand. These pressures will not disappear. Eliminating government wastage is not a durable solution and difficult choices cannot be avoided. So, who should pay for increasing costs, students or government – or which combination of these?

This article analyses whether computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are suitable for projecting the likely consequences of implementing a national minimum wage. Referring to modelling exercises undertaken by the National Treasury and the Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU), it shows that their projection of a strongly negative impact on employment and other macroeconomic indicators is a direct result of the architecture and assumptions of these models. By design these models preclude alternative outcomes; this renders them rather unsuitable as guides to policymaking.

Over the past 15 years Government has promoted cooperatives at national and provincial levels with the aim of enabling small producers to tap into mainstream economic activities. Tens of thousands of cooperatives were formed in processes with officials’ performance appraisals based on the number of new cooperatives being formed. A 2014 study in the Free State indicates a very low survival rate of cooperatives and little evidence of job creation. This accords with earlier findings of an EU-funded study at the national level.

Foreign migrants often enter informal employment as day labourers. They compete with South Africans for jobs in this curb-side labour market. Three surveys of day labourers working in Tshwane between 2004 and 2015 reveal two important tendencies. First, the foreign-migrant component has increased from 12% to just over 55% in 11 years. Secondly, the wages and the level of poverty of both foreign and South African day labourers have worsened in the same period.

Using a small-area census approach, this article reports on changes in informal micro-enterprise activity in the Cape township of Delft between 2010 and 2015. The number of micro-enterprises has doubled (from 879 to 1798) in five years, with growth recorded in almost all sectors (notably take-away food and street trade). The increase in the total is contrary to the official national trend. The prevalence of informal enterprises in residential areas, compared to those in the high street, has not changed.

Macroeconomic data on wages and productivity suggest that there has not been any constant tendency for real wages either to fall behind or increase out of line with increases in productivity. Upward shifts have affected real wages sporadically, but have subsequently been offset by downward shifts, leaving a one-to-one long-run relationship between real wages and productivity. This is contrary to the conventional wisdom in both the labour union and business worlds.

The building of large numbers of housing units in isolated greenfield locations has had detrimental side effects on our cities over the last two decades. Yet a series of new megaprojects, designed to accelerate the delivery of housing, is now on the cards. Because they are to be built on cheap peripheral land, these schemes threaten to reinforce urban fragmentation, inefficiency and exclusion.

The time and monetary costs of commuting are extremely high and have increased over the last 20 years. They imply a substantial ‘tax’ on the wages of those who commute to work, notably on the users of public transport. Commuters increasingly use private vehicles and minibus taxis today compared to 1993. The government’s public transport subsidies seem to benefit those in the (lower) middle of the income distribution rather than low-income workers.

It has been argued that properly focused workplace intermediaries can reshape the labour market to become more youth friendly. Case studies of NGO intermediaries in South Africa offer some optimism but also caution in this regard. Although the intermediaries were able to match unemployed youth to jobs, smooth the transition to work and even positively influence employers’ reticence, they are small in scale and costs are high – and they have yet to broker larger pacts to add more jobs.

The inflexibility of the labour market is commonly used as a scapegoat to explain high unemployment. Yet new evidence shows that only in specific contexts (unionized workers in the short run) does wage rigidity restrain the ability of the labour market to absorb workers. In the long run, wages are much more flexible and structural factors explain more of the unemployment puzzle. The policy debate on unemployment and wage flexibility needs to take these subtleties into account.

In most countries with VAT, certain goods and services are zero rated to alleviate the tax burden on the poor. However, this may not be the most cost-effective way of helping the poor. We investigate the appropriateness of the products currently zero rated and the impact of this on the poor, the implications for tax revenue were it to be removed, and the contribution to poverty relief of zero rating compared to targeted social transfers.

Although many children are maltreated at home, we know little about the effects of abuse on long-term child development. This article explores the association between different ways in which children are maltreated and two educational outcomes (numeracy test scores and dropout). Children who are physically maltreated (e.g. hit hard) regularly suffer severe adverse consequences in terms of their numeracy test scores and probability of dropout – and hence their chances of employment and higher earnings.

A small-area census of micro-enterprises in Cape Town townships reveals that informal enterprises are located throughout the township, including in the residential areas. Three-quarters of the enterprises are located beyond the ‘high-street’. The most common enterprises (liquor and spaza shops) are not situated in what one would expect to be the prime business area with its considerable pedestrian traffic, but are in residential areas. Policies to promote the township economy need to come to terms with this reality.

While the share of capital increased, labour’s share of total income earned in South Africa fell significantly during the first two decades after 1994. These trends could contribute to a deterioration of income inequality, given that the ownership of capital – and thus the income from capital – is concentrated in fewer individuals than is the case with salaries and wages. This article explores labour’s falling share, with particular reference to the manufacturing and mining sectors.

In developing countries, agricultural growth is generally employment intensive and pro-poor but this sector in South Africa has been subject to a drastic decline in tariffs, pricing, infrastructure and other forms of support. This has not been compensated for by alternative measures such as expenditure aimed at facilitating small-scale agriculture and effective land reform. The result has been poor economic performance and rapidly declining employment in commercial agriculture with little sign of revival in the small-scale sector.

A recent IMF study of several countries provides robust evidence that a high level of income inequality weakens the prospects of sustained economic growth and reduces the duration of growth spells. Redistributive steps, by contrast, do not have a noticeable negative effect on growth. Therefore, a reduction in inequality that is achieved through redistributive steps could have a net pro-growth effect. The policy challenge for South Africa is to find the best policy mix to achieve that.

It is important to know whether a social grant such as the old age pension eases financial constraints in rural areas, thereby allowing young men to migrate to urban areas for work – or whether these grants encourage idleness and dependency. This study finds no evidence of the latter. Instead, for young rural males there is an increase in their chances of migrating and finding work when a member of the household starts receiving the pension. Notably, these effects are only present for young men with at least a matric.

South Africa’s large racial gap in enrolment in tertiary education can be attributed to the widely varying quality of primary and secondary education rather than to the low incomes of most black and coloured households. Thus, easing credit constraints for prospective tertiary students via increased financial aid is expected to have a limited impact on African and coloured enrolment. Instead, policymakers should focus on improving educational quality at schools attended by children from low-income households.

Amidst a decline in general poverty rates since 2000, women and people living in female-headed households still are significantly worse off. Women are up to 30% poorer than men on average. There is an even larger poverty gap between female- and male-headed households – a difference of as much as 100%, despite improved education, health and basic services. Better health, water and sanitation services, especially in rural areas, should narrow these gaps significantly.

The National Development Plan envisions the achievement of a ‘capable and developmental state’. Developmental states are usually associated with high economic growth. Such states in East Asia often are seen as models for SA to emulate. However, given the structure of the SA economy, state and society, a developmental state is not suitable, nor attainable. The concept of a social investment state is a better alternative, but it will need key institutional and policy reforms to work.

There is a widespread view that countries no longer need to industrialise in order to develop. However, in South Africa manufacturing remains the core driver of GDP growth and direct employment while other sectors – particularly many services sectors – are likely to increase employment on the basis of growing demand flowing from a growing GDP. A nuanced understanding of the direct and indirect linkages through which diversified manufacturing growth can boost economy-wide employment is essential.

A century after the Land Act of 1913, and 20 years after the abolition of homelands, differences in poverty persist between the former homeland areas and the rest of South Africa. However, remarkably, hunger gaps between the former homelands and other regions have been eliminated in the post-apartheid era. The main cause has been the disproportionately high number of persons eligible for social grants in the former homelands, rather than increased food production or higher labour market incomes due to land reform.

The Employment Incentive Tax Bill offers tax subsidies to firms to employ new young workers. An evaluation of the impact of a wage subsidy voucher indicates that employment incentives increase the likelihood of young job-seekers being employed; they also increase the time young people remain employed. There is no evidence of older or existing workers being replaced. Such incentives are a relatively cheap and effective way to create employment, but are unlikely to create large numbers of jobs for young people.

In the late 1990s the Department of Education restricted the re-enrolment of over-aged learners and the number of times underperforming learners could repeat a grade. This was intended to reduce the number of learners in the school system, but may have contributed to a sudden increase in measured unemployment. Of the 2.3 million increase in the number of unemployed between 1997 and 2003, up to 900 000 may be due to unintended effects of these policies which brought hidden (youth) unemployment into the open.

Marginalised businesses provide livelihood and income opportunities for a large section of the population. However, these businesses are not able to capture growth opportunities because of several constraints; they continue to operate on the periphery of the mainstream economy. Yet they could become a major source of employment growth. Efforts to unlock this potential must concentrate on exploiting value chains and making government policy more responsive to the unique needs and challenges of marginalised businesses.

Two very different pictures emerge when one compares income changes of the relatively affluent ‘middle class’ with those of people in the literal middle of the income spectrum. In the affluent middle there has been significant racial transformation and growth of the ‘black middle class’. However, households in the actual middle of the income spectrum have experienced the lowest income growth of all groups since 1993. Both perspectives are crucial for the pursuit of an equitable path of development.

The introduction of minimum wage laws in five non-agricultural sectors has not been associated with a significant loss in employment in the years following their promulgation – a period when most sectors also saw a significant increase in real hourly wages. Indeed, several sectors recorded an increase in employment. However, in some sectors there is evidence of a relatively small reduction in the hours worked by employees. On the whole, the effects of minimum wages are varied.

The frequently reported ‘crisis in graduate unemployment’ in South Africa is a fallacy based on questionable research. Not only is graduate unemployment low at less than 6%, but it also compares well with rates in developed countries. The large expansion of black graduate numbers has not significantly exacerbated unemployment amongst graduates. Contrary to popular perception, such graduates – many from ‘formerly disadvantaged’ universities – have been snapped up by the private sector. Black graduates are, however, still more likely to be unemployed than white graduates.

It is estimated that less than half of the present main budget deficit of 5.7% is explained by cyclical factors. The remainder reflects a non-cyclical, structural component of the deficit. The increase in the structural budget deficit since 2008 may constrain the ability of government to sustain its present revenue and expenditure policies. An in-depth understanding of the structural component of the fiscal position as opposed to its cyclical element is important for sustainable long-term government financing and planning.

In trying to reduce unemployment in South Africa, the pursuit of higher economic growth is the single most agreed-upon policy strategy. The consensus on this ‘obvious solution’ may blind us to the fact that economic growth, though important, may only be half of the solution. Attempts to fine-tune and turbo-boost the formal-economy ‘engine of growth’ to absorb more labour are fundamentally constrained. Economic policy makers must look at other options for generating employment and self-employment for unemployed people.

Adcorp’s estimated unemployment rate is so low that it disposes of the unemployment crisis. But Adcorp uses a crude currency-demand method to estimate the size of the unrecorded economy, despite researchers’ strong criticism of this method. To estimate informal sector employment, Adcorp mixes up definitions of informal employment and the unrecorded economy and guesses at the labour intensity of the unrecorded economy. They also guess at the number of illegal immigrants. Moreover, Adcorp’s estimates have no statistical precision. Its figures are neither reliable nor credible.

A job-search subsidy has been proposed as a measure to help people find employment. At least three criteria need to be met to create new jobs for those who receive the subsidy. First, it needs to be used only to search for jobs or to remove the financial constraints that prevent people from searching for jobs; second, firms need to recruit through the channels which subsidy holders actually use to seek employment; and third, the relative cost of labour needs to fall.

Average wages in agriculture have risen substantially in all provinces since the introduction of minimum wages in 2003 - the gap between the actual and the minimum wage has declined significantly. Compliance has been highest in the Western Cape and Gauteng, where average agricultural wages were close to or above the minimum wage even before it was introduced and wages have continued to rise thereafter. Although enforcement appears to have had a limited impact due in part to limited penalties, more effective inspection would be an important way to improve compliance.

Small and medium-sized firms hold the potential to absorb most of the unemployed in South Africa. In this the NDP may be correct. However, the NDP may not be correct in arguing that exports can be the main catalyst of the growth the country needs to address poverty and employment. Several factors hinder such a strategy. A more domestically-focused policy aimed at production (and services) for local consumption might bear more fruit.

The debate on unemployment is fragmented into at least three sub-discourses, i.e. those of macroeconomists, labour economists and poverty analysts. This results in inconclusive analyses and narrow, flawed proposals to address the problem. This fragmentation feeds into the policy field. Sustainable and consistent remedies for unemployment and poverty will require an integrated analysis that covers the formal sector, the informal economy and survivalist activities – and especially linkages and barriers between these segments.

Given South Africa’s high levels of unemployment, the relatively small size of the micro-enterprise sector is a conundrum. This article argues that structural inequality is the reason for this – in particular, inequality in the structure of the economy, the legacies of spatial inequality and the continued inequalities in human development. Their combined effect is to limit the scope for poor people to escape poverty via self-employment. This explains the limited extent and small range of informal employment.

The South African government continues to pursue efforts to 'migrate' informal enterprises to the formal sector. This article examines the impact of regulations and law enforcement on the 'lived' economy of informal micro-entrepreneurs. Spatial analysis shows how the scope and distribution of informal economic activities are directly affected by regulation, land use planning and other controls. Such controls that effectively disallow informality are poor-unfriendly and harm livelihoods, self-employment and employment.